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This study analyzes the impact that Corporate Governance has in the firm 
value of electric utilities in 2018. It develops the description of the role that 
Corporate Governance plays in an enterprise, making an emphasis in the 
behaviors that are seen towards the firm innovation capacity and the importance of 
choosing the electric industry as the sample of analysis. Data availability was a 
major constraint to assess the proposed relationship. Nevertheless, an OLS 
regression was performed for a 2018 cross-sectional database evaluating firm 
value, measured by the Tobin’s Q ratio, against the governance rating of the 
CSRHub and several other control variables. Our results show a positive and 
significant relationship between the quality of corporate governance and the value 
of the company. In view of the restrictions caused by the data availability for an 
analysis of this kind, suggestions are made for further research that can be held to 
strengthen the results shown in this study. 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Firm Value, Electric Utilities, Firm Innovation 
Capacity. 





In this fast-changing world, aspects of everyday life tend to transform in 
order to adapt to the requirements that new generations and new market dynamics 
demand to function correctly. The behavior of companies worldwide is not the 
exception. Corporate practices have been redefined to satisfy the new intangible 
economy and the new patterns of consumption, production and investment that 
have changed substantially due to globalization and the liberalization of markets 
(Haskel & Westlake, 2017). 
The study of electric utilities is pertinent to be developed because they have 
become a dynamic industry in the recent decades due to the entry of new 
technologies into the power generation and distribution markets, situation that has 
been accompanied by a strong trend towards digitalization. The electric industry 
has also been exposed to global changes (i.e., Kyoto protocol and emission 
constraints) and it is considered one of the economic development engines of the 
countries. Its importance lies in the fact that almost all economic and social 
functions depend on the safe and reliable operation of the energy-producing 
infrastructures. Moreover, the total energy consumption in the world is projected to 
double by 2050, which will turn electrical power and electricity into the type of 
energy that will define global growth in the next two decades (Novosel, 2018). 
 To introduce the concept of corporate governance, it is important to 
mention that it is derived from the theory of the principal and the agent, is a 
business model that has been used frequently for a long time. The increasing 
interest for good corporate governance can be explained from a preventive 
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perspective, in light of the multiple corporate scandals like Enron, Volkswagen, 
Nissan, Odebretch, and others. Furthermore, as Bobillo, Rodríguez-Sanz, & 
Tejerina-Gaite (2018) state, this interest can also be explained by the opportunity 
that good corporate government represents for building a greater competitive 
advantage by involving activities that foster innovation and intangible assets 
promoted by senior managers. 
Having described the above, it is relevant to ask: what does corporate 
governance stands for? What is its role in business world? And, in what 
percentage does it currently contributes to the company’s performance?  
To answer these questions, initially, we present a theoretical context of what 
corporate governance is and the role it plays in the new competitive and innovative 
environment of the economy. Then, we describe the data that will be used in the 
econometric model that evaluates how much the quality of governance in electric 
utilities determine its firm value. An OLS regression was performed for a 2018 
cross-sectional database evaluating firm value, measured by the Tobin’s Q ratio, 
against the governance rating of the CSRHub, a certified sustainability 
management tool which consolidates information on corporate governance, 
employees, environment and community on more than 17,000 companies from 134 
industries in 141 countries. The model is accompanied by several other control 
variables.  
The year chosen is 2018 since it is a year that may evidence the recovery of 
economies and because it is the most recent information available. We obtain a 
statistically significant result for an improvement of 0.061 in the Tobin’s Q due to a 
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10-point increase in the governance rating. These results are subsequently 
analyzed and followed by recommendations for further research that can nourish 
the analysis proposed in this study. 
Theoretical framework 
Corporate governance are the mechanisms that enables reaching 
independence between the management (CEO) and financing (investors) of the 
firm (Shleifer & Vishny, 1996).  It is a structure that specifies the distribution of 
rights and responsibilities within the organization and establish the rules and 
procedures for decision-making (Bubbico, Giorgino, & Monda, 2012). The 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2004, p. 11), 
defines corporate governance as: “… a key element to increase economic 
efficiency and potentiate growth, as well as for encouraging investors’ confidence”. 
Based on the aforementioned, corporate government can be summarized as 
the political structure inside a firm in which shareholders or investors, who provide 
the firms financially, assure their returns by minimizing moral hazard in order to 
maximize the firm's’ economic benefit and not the directors’ personal interests. This 
role holds in actual business environments, but the way in which activities are 
developed to achieve enterprises goals is what has undergone into a substantial 
transformation. 
Nowadays, information technology has improved the flow of information 
around companies, making it more accessible and manageable by a larger number 
of people, a situation that has reinforced the “command and control” type of 
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organizational design. As a result, directors can perform a more effective 
monitoring and advising role to ensure that managers see a bigger and more 
precise picture of the company, with the objective of improving and constructing 
new value creation actions that are consistent with the organizational strategy 
(Haskel & Westlake, 2017; Pinillos, Fernández Fernandez, & Fernández Mateo, 
2018). 
Corporate governance no longer represents only an authority figure, the 
board in conjunction with the managers provide leadership and strategic direction. 
They plan, execute and determine the corporate speech to inspire and motivate all 
those involved with the company (Haskel & Westlake, 2017). 
 Management control systems are built around the framework of strategy 
and structure, and it’s the top managers who, as grand strategists, allocate the 
resources and create a broad scale purpose that allows employees the freedom to 
deliver. In other words, they mark the pace of the company by deciding the 
assignment of the resources that will be invested and then used by employees 
(Dutta, 2008). 
Businesses with strong internal cultures of good management and high 
performance, create and maintain these cultures through innovation that requires 
investing in organizational change that help make good short-term decisions 
(Haskel & Westlake, 2017). 
Considering the profound change in the nature and conduct of business due 
to fiercer competition and new information technology, the shift that modern 
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industrial era is experiencing is kicked by intangible assets that make up the main 
source of competitive advantage (Dutta, 2008). In this scenario, where electric 
utilities are the subject of evaluation and they have different market characteristics, 
to have a greater growth by taking advantage of the current dynamics of the 
economy, they must potentiate their innovative capacity towards other intangible 
assets that provide them with new sources of value such as patents, employee 
commitment, reputation or software. 
This tridimensional relationship between corporate governance, firm 
innovation capacity and intangible assets is explained by (Bobillo et al., 2018) and 
works as follows: Corporate governance is considered a driver of innovation 
capacity, since the relationship between shareholders, investors and owners 
determine investing decisions. As the Board of directors decides the distribution of 
economic resources in a company, a firm corporate governance, which intends to 
minimize moral hazard and maximize economic benefits, affects the amount of 
resources invested in research and development which is afterwards derived in 
innovation. Afterwards, firm’s innovation capacity dictates the company’s ability to 
generate new knowledge in the form of intangible assets. By improving the firm’s 
innovation capacity, the company creates knowledge and materializes it through 
assets that ultimately will create value (Bobillo et al., 2018). 
In line with this last relationship that places corporate governance as the 
promoter of intangibles, the growing importance of the role of corporate 
governance can be seen then in another way in Graph 1 by the means of the 
change in the participation of the type of components that make S&P 500 market 
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value, and in Graph 2, which shows the increase in the number of mentions of the 
word 'intangibles' in the abstract, title or keyword of the academic articles of the 
ScienceDirect scientific research base. 
Graph 1. Components of S&P 500 market value. 
 
Source: (Ocean Tomo, 2017), own elaboration. 
Graph 2. Reference of “intangibles” in scientific journals. 
 




“Sustainable competitive advantage comes if a company can do something 
distinctive or if it owns a distinctive asset” (Haskel & Westlake, 2017, p. 221) 
These assets, called as “strategic resources”, can be its reputation, a 
network of customers, trained employees or product design, but ultimately the most 
distinctive asset will be the ability to weave all these assets together. Therefore, it 
can be said that a particularly valuable intangible asset will be the organization 
itself (Haskel & Westlake, 2017). 
Building a good organization is eventually the goal of corporate governance 
and it is one characteristic of successful businesses. A well-managed organization 
is defined as continuously monitoring and trying to improve its processes, setting 
targets and promoting high performance. Two companies of the same industry with 
the same type of tangible assets can be vastly different, at least partly because of 
its reputation but also due to the organization itself (Haskel & Westlake, 2017). 
Therefore, regardless of the industry or the country in which the companies 
are located, the behaviors of corporate governance as a whole can vary simply 
from company to company. Nevertheless, when analyzing individual variables such 
as the specific profile of the board members, similarities can be evidenced within 
the industries because of the natural characteristics of the business, or within 
countries because of the parameters that must be followed in the information 
disclosure exercise. 
Industries that are linked to certain amount of uncertainty, that involve new 
technology and new markets, well connected directors help smooth some 
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problems that affect intangible investment because their presence acts as a good 
signal to investors giving them confidence that the company has a well position to 
manage and enforce its rights. Companies working in the emerging technology 
sector, such as electricity generation and distribution, that often depend on 
intangibles, with a grand and recognized director on their board, can get increases 
in their share price and a greater facility to raise financing (Haskel & Westlake, 
2017). 
As mentioned, it has long been proved that good corporate governance has 
always played an important role in generating value for companies and its potential 
benefits have been already deeply discussed in literature. In this section, we 
answered the first two questions raised by this study regarding what corporate 
governance is and how it behaves in the business world. However, the decision to 
implement efforts that seek to improve corporate governance within an 
organization will always be linked to the evaluation of the cost that has to be 
incurred to develop correctly this activity (Bubbico et al., 2012).   
To generate tools to decide if this investment pays off and taking into 
account all the transformations to which the organizations have been exposed in 
order to adapt the new technological tools, the new collaborative cultures and the 
new requirements of the market, the last important question is still unanswered: 
how much of today’s corporate governance quality determines the performance of 
electric utilities measured by Tobin’s Q? 
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To respond to this, in the next sections it is described the quantitative 




We study the effect of corporate governance on the value of electric utilities 
invited to be part of the RobecoSAM Corporate Sustainability Assessment (CSA) 
for the Dow Jones Sustainability Indices (DJSI)1.  
According to Robinson, Kleffner, & Bertels (2011), being added to the DJSI 
ends up in a tangible and sustained benefit to the firm’s value. This benefit is seen 
as an answer towards the perspective shareholders give to sustainability and how 
this contributes to the reputation of the company, due to its deep evaluation of 
environmental, social and economic aspects.  
Hence, the sample is chosen based on this index due to the fact that the 
companies that are part of it are expected to provide information of good quality 
and quantity to the market because of the common requirements that must be 
followed for being listed in the stock market and also because of their willingness to 
be assessed for this index that also demands certain level of disclosure. 
Initially, the dataset was planned to be a data panel, covering the 
information from 2011 to 2018 on the variables which will be mentioned below. Due 
to data availability, this data panel was unbalanced and thus, a challenge to build 
                                                     




an index for the corporate governance variables. After a series of attempts for 
obtaining reliable information, the data found for the corporate government analysis 
from CSRHub was only retrievable for 2018 (CSRHub, 2019). For this reason, the 
final dataset used for the analysis is a 2018 cross-section made up of 90 electric 
utilities from around the world.  
The CSA is conducted annually in conjunction with S&P Dow Jones Indices 
and RobecoSAM, which is an investment specialist that focuses exclusively on 
sustainable investment. The companies that are eligible to be assessed are the 
largest publicly traded companies globally that score a high percentage on 
sustainability performance within the industry and / or the country (Robecosam, 
2019). 
A dataset was constructed for the 90 electric utilities with its Tobin’s Q ratio, 
Corporate Governance Rating, Firm Size, Leverage, Profitability, Growth 
Opportunities Ratio and Turnover Rate, variables which, according to (Black, Jang, 
& Kim, 2006) may explain Tobin’s Q and its relationship with corporate 
governance. The data on the financial variables analyzed was taken from 
Bloomberg and the corporate government information comes from the CSRHub 
web tool. 
Dependent variable  
The use of Tobin's Q is a common practice in corporate governance studies 
(Black et al., 2006), because it is considered as a “reliable measure of a firm’s 
performance based on its growth potential” (Ciftci, Tatoglu, Wood, Demirbag, & 
Zaim, 2019, p. 93). Besides, it has the capacity of capturing the effectiveness of 
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management relatively better than other valuation multiples (Brahmana, 
Brahmana, & Ho, 2018; Ciftci et al., 2019). 
The valuation of companies can be done through different approaches that 
can lead to limitations in the results. “The usage of accounting performance 
measures may be subject of manipulation and variations in accounting and 
consolidation activities”, also “market-based measures of performance may be 
affected by investor anticipation” (Ciftci et al., 2019, p.93). As a result, Tobin’s Q 
ratio is selected for the analysis because it combines these two approaches 
equally by computing the market value of total assets divided by their replacement 
costs (Bloomberg, 2019). 
Despite the fact some will argue Tobin’s Q might carry shortcomings to the 
financial performance analyses of electric utilities due to its regulated incomes, the 
analysis proposed relies on this variable considering the availability of data and the 
inconsistencies on the exercises carried out with other profitability indicators such 
as ROA and ROE.2 
Independent variables  
Corporate governance rating 
Over the years, there have been several efforts to summarize corporate 
governance variables into one index that could assess the quality of the 
governance in the firms among different countries and industries, and ultimately 
serve as a tool to determine its relationship with performance (Bubbico et al., 
                                                     
2 The results of the regressions with ROA and ROE as dependent variables can be found in Annexes 1 and 2. 
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2012). The DJSI, the CDP, and the FTSE4Good are among the most recognized 
indices, but they do not share methodologies, objectives, or a common 
questionnaire, which makes it is difficult to have a global vision on which aspects 
corporate governance have a greater impact on firms (Pinillos et al., 2018). 
 Due to the variety of reporting frameworks and its lack of standardization, 
comparisons between companies and industries remains a major challenge. Most 
of the revised studies, as part of the steps to measure the impact of corporate 
governance on firm’s value, built their own government index according to the 
specific characteristics of the sample that is analyzed. 
The data used for the construction of the most recognized indices was not 
reachable or available for the firms in our sample. Therefore, we use an alternative 
measure of corporate governance provided by CSRHub, a web tool that combines 
sustainability data from diverse sources, and is certified by B Corporation, the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and other performance standards. CSRHub 
constructs a consistent set of ratings enclosed in a final Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) ranking, that takes into account 4 categories: community, 
employees, environment and governance. 
For this cross-section sample, we use CSRHub’s corporate governance 
quality rating as a measure of governance performance –our independent variable 
of interest– in this study. It is important to clear out, that the rating goes from zero 
to 100, being 100 perfect corporate governance practices. Its computation takes 
into account three subcategories: 
The Board subcategory covers principles related to board committee structure and 
composition, it includes how the company incent executives and board members to 
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achieve financial targets. The Leadership Ethics subcategory measures the 
company relationships with its various stakeholders and its commitment toward 
integrating social and environmental aspects into the overall core strategy and the 
day-to-day operations of the company. Finally, the Transparency and Reporting 
subcategory covers corporate policies and practices aligned with sustainability 
goals and whether the company is a signatory of leading global entities (CSRHub, 
2019). 
Firm specific controls 
Firm size, leverage, growth opportunities, profitability and liquidity are 
included as control variables that reduce the omitted variable bias.  
For firm size we use the natural logarithm of total assets. This variable is 
used in natural logarithm due to the size of the number and the differences 
between the data. Since Tobin’s Q represents the ratio between the market value 
and the assets value, we expect to observe a negative relationship between firm 
size and Tobin’s Q ratio. Also, larger firms are more likely to have larger boards 
which lead to greater agency costs and organization inefficiency, so a negatively 
association with firm performance is expected (Bubbico et al., 2012). 
 The ratio of debt to common share equity measures leverage. It can affect 
firm performance negatively because higher levels of debt increase bankruptcy 
risk, but on the other hand it can affect positively because high levels of debt 




Profitability is taken from the ratio of operating income to net sales. It is 
expected a positive correlation with Tobin’s Q as more profitable economic results 
are meant to be rewarded in market price (Brahmana et al., 2018).  
Capital expenditure divided by sales measure the growth opportunities ratio 
and capital intensity. Capital expenditure is spent on tangible fixed assets which 
are expected to have a positive effect on the value of the company. It is an 
alternative measure of firm efficiency (Black et al., 2006). 
Natural logarithm of the turnover rate measures the total amount traded of 
the security. The value represents all trade prices multiplied by the number of 
shares relating to each price. It is used as a measure for the stock liquidity 
because firms with more easily traded shares might bring higher share prices 
(Black et al., 2006).  
After considering different scenarios and alternatives, the empirical 2018 cross 
sectional regression model suggested for the analysis here undertaken is shown 
as Equation 1. 
(1)  𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 
 
+𝛽4𝑂𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑛𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 
 
 
For the model previously described, the OLS regression and descriptive statistics 





Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for related variables, which will allow 
to understand and analyze results accurately. The quantity of observations taken 
into the regression are 90 companies (electric utilities) from all around the world. 
The values for the Tobin’s Q oscillate between 0.6 and 2.17, with a mean of 1.16, 
which can be interpreted as a reflection of underinvestment due to overvalued 
stocks. 
“Stronger corporate governance could increase firms’ market price by 
reducing overinvestment”(Black et al., 2006, p. 378). According to the above, 
Tobin’s Q mean can be a response to the good quality of corporate governance 
that can be generally evidenced in electric utilities. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Tobin's Q 0.60 2.17 1.16 1.13 0.26 
Government Rating 20 61 40.53 40.50 9.29 
LN Total Assets 6.84 12.69 9.82 9.90 1.21 
Leverage 1.11 31.88 3.80 3.30 3.47 
Operating Income to 
Sales 
-4.36 84.44 22.73 18.79 16.79 
Capex to Sales 0.06 104.59 21.71 18.79 18.25 
LN Turnover 18.69 25.16 22.20 22.34 1.87 
Tool used: Stata, own elaboration 
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After identifying the minimum and maximum values and the mean of our 
variables, we proceeded to analyze correlation between variables, to see if its 
signs and magnitudes were true according to the literature revised (Table 2)3. 
 















Tobin's Q 1.00       
Government Rating 0.33 1.00      
LN Total Assets -0.26 -0.01 1.00     
Leverage 0.31 0.03 0.19 1.00    
Operating Income to Sales 0.24 -0.01 -0.33 -0.22 1.00   
Capex to Sales 0.07 0.01 0.16 -0.08 0.27 1.00  
LN Turnover 0.16 0.17 0.71 0.29 -0.20 0.23 1.00 
 
Tool used: Stata, own elaboration 
 
As expected, signs of the variables analyzed were all positive respect 
Tobin’s Q, except LnTotalAssets due to the Tobin’s Q composition. The ratio 
divides the market value by the asset value, which leads to the conclusion that the 
relationship between the total assets must be negative. Also, it is pertinent to 
notice the fact that the correlation between Tobin’s Q and Government Rating is 
significant and the biggest value in the analysis, reaching a 0.333. 
                                                     




Table 3 presents the results of an Ordinary Least Squares regression to 
assess the relationship between variables with the 2018 cross-sectional dataset.  
We test for the presence of heteroscedasticity with the Breusch – Pagan test. 
Since the null hypothesis for homoscedastic data is rejected, we use robust 
standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity.  




Tobin's Q Dependent Variable 
Government Rating 0.0061*** 
(0.0021) 




Operating Income to Sales 0.0031*** 
(0.0011) 
Capex to Sales 0.0001 
(0.0013) 
LN Turnover 0.0664*** 
(0.0159) 
Note: *** Significant at 1% 
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Tool used: Stata, Own elaboration 
Taking in consideration the results of the OLS regression made to the 
sample, when analyzing coefficients by means of elasticity, the proportion of an 
improvement according to the average in the corporate governance quality is 
reflected in the Tobin’s Q ratio by a 21% increase. Also, the relationship can be 
seen by means of a 10 points increase in governance rating that implies a 0.061 
increase in Tobin’s Q ratio, a number that behaves similarly to the literature 
evaluated. Black et al. (2006), who also used a cross-section database, analyzed 
the relationship based on a different corporate government index constructed for 
Korean listed enterprises and obtained the following results: “A moderate 10-point 
increase in KCGI (Corporate Government Index) predicts a 0.064 increase in 
Tobin’s Q” (Black et al., 2006, p. 379). 
Analyzing the results of other papers where panel data was used and an 
own corporate governance index was built to study the relationship between 
Tobin’s Q and Corporate Governance, coefficients of 0.016 are found by Bubbico 
et al. (2012); in (Ammann, Oesch, & Schmid, 2011) one standard deviation 
increase in one of its corporate governance index, is associated with an increase in 
Tobin’s Q of 0.06 and Ararat, Black, & Yurtoglu (2017, p. 129) found that “one 
standard deviation increase in governance predicts an 8% - 10% increase in 
Tobin’s Q”. In view of this, it is possible to highlight the fact that having more data 




Due to the high correlation that were found between the Firm size measured 
by the natural logarithm of total assets and the variables that measure liquidity and 
profitability, natural logarithm of turnover and operating income to sales 
respectively, a new regression was made without the firm value variable. To this 
extent, governance coefficient takes a value of 0.0080.4 
Firm size has a negative and significant effect in Tobin’s Q, holding the 
expected relationship (-). Smaller firms indicate better market performance and are  
often are better at facing coordination problems because they are able to reach 
decisions rapidly (Ciftci et al., 2019). One-unit increase in the natural logarithm of 
total assets affects negatively the Tobin’s Q in 8.37%. 
According to our results, there is a positive relationship between firm value 
and leverage, which implies that higher levels of leverage in the firms analyzed are 
associated with a stronger firm market performance. According to Ibhagui & 
Olokoyo (2018), the sense of this relationship hasn’t been completely defined by 
literature, since it can be significantly positive or negative, and following their 
hypothesis, it is determined by firm size. The positive relationship in the analysis 
might be due to cash flow effects. Higher debt levels end in less cash available, 
which may decrease potential agency costs. Debt financing incentivize managers 
to operate in a more efficient manner (Bubbico et al., 2012). 
Our results also show that profitability has a positive impact on Tobin’s Q: 
Given 10 points increase in the ratio of the operating income to net sales, the 
                                                     
4 Results of this regression are shown in the fourth annex. 
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Tobin’s Q ratio will experience an increase in 0.03. The intuition behind this result 
is that the market acknowledges the companies with higher economic benefits. As 
an example, we can compare two companies included in the sample: Engie Brazil 
Energia presents a high operating income to net sales ratio of 41,71 and a high 
Tobin’s Q ratio of 1,87, contrasting Electric Power Development that presents a 
12,19 operating income to net sales ratio and a Tobin’s Q ratio of 0,89, which may 
be considered low, taking into account the mean of the sample in both variables, 
which is 22,73 and 1,16 respectively.  
For the sample analyzed, the variable of capital expenditure to sales does 
not explain changes in Tobin’s Q. If the coefficient was statistically significant, the 
analysis of the positive relationship would be that a firm with more and good quality 
assets would be better valued in the market.  
Turnover as a measure of liquidity resulted in a positive and significant 
relationship with firm value. The higher the turnover rate, the more liquid the 
company’s shares are, which ends up in a higher firm value. 
Conclusions 
According to the results obtained, in the sample of electric utilities assessed 
by the CSA of the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, and following the CSRHub 
Government Rating, there is in fact a positive and significant relationship between 
current corporate governance quality and its firm’s value, measured by Tobin’s Q. 
The above leads to the conclusion that good corporate government practices are 
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outstandingly important, and that its application on electric utilities brings higher 
firm value as an outcome. 
The disclosure of different types of information by companies is currently 
only made by the request of official entities of each country that regulate and 
supervise their operations or because companies are linked to private 
organizations such as RobecoSam. The first source of information does not have 
good quality and quantity of data, and the data of the second source is not openly 
available to all publics. If the importance of corporate governance could be 
empirically demonstrated in this study despite the limitation of data, other 
managerial theories that could be developed in the future with more information, 
may contrast more deeply or with a different approach the hypothesis here 
represented. 
Limitations and recommendations 
All corporate governance studies have important limitations regarding 
endogeneity, and this one is not the exception. Firms adopt good governance rules 
in order to give a positive signal to the market, and it is the signal, not necessarily 
the governance rules, that affect firm value. In the reverse situation, firms with high 
Tobin’s Q choose good governance rules and practices, presumably because this 
further enhances their market value. There will then be a causal connection 
between governance and firm value, connection that the OLS coefficient will 
overstate (Black et al., 2006). 
 Despite including in this model important control variables supported by 
literature to overcome endogeneity, the lack of good quality data for the total length 
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of this study dataset does not make it possible to have an additional extension of 
control variables that can give complementary conclusions regarding its 
relationship with Tobin’s Q, nor does it help with endogeneity problems or control 
heterogeneity.  
Using a data panel in a firm fixed effect model can also help solve the 
aforementioned limitations (Black et al., 2006), but this approach cannot be 
implemented because of the cross-sectional characteristic of the dataset, which is 
due to the availability of governance data in CSRHub. 
On the other hand, to present empirical evidence of the important role of 
intangibles fostered by innovation, which was initially described, it is necessary to 
have more information, but the measure of intangible investment is still ambiguous 
and poor in balance sheets or national accounts and this may be a reason why the 
shifting from tangible investment to intangible investment has still not been 
accurately documented to make comparisons between industries and countries 
(Haskel & Westlake, 2017). Even though some recommendations might be taken 
from different documents like the Intangible Asset Market Value Study (Ocean 
Tomo, 2017), the OECD Corporate Reporting of intangible Assets (OECD 
Corporate Governance Comitee, 2012) or the Oslo Manual (OECD & Eurostat, 
2018) it is necessary to highlight the importance to start to measure these 
intangible variables, define methodologies at a national level and eventually, 
international standards as to be able to formally measure and estimate the impact 
of intangible assets in firm’s value.  
 After all the data restrictions that we found during the developing of this 
study, it is undeniable the great need for good data disclosure at firm and national 
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level regarding innovation and intangible assets. The availability of this data could 
allow the academic community to assess in a better way their importance and 
repercussions on the economy and eventually find methods to homogenize their 
quantification worldwide.  
 In spite of the restriction of information and data quality under which this 
study was undertaken, the results are encouraging. We expect that this work 
generates a greater interest in favor of conducting further research regarding the 
current role of organizational practices applied to different industries or specific-
country analysis. By doing so, it might encourage the efforts to reach universal 
measurement of certain firm variables that are important to study, but very difficult 
to consolidate for its correct evaluation. 
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ROA Dependent Variable 
Government Rating -0.0135 
(0.0265) 




Operating Income to Sales 0.1072*** 
(0.0149) 
Capex to Sales -0.323** 
(0.0130) 
Note: *** Significant to 1%, ** Significant to 5%, * Significant to 10% 
Tool used: Stata, Own elaboration 





ROE Dependent Variable 
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Government Rating 0.0017 
(0.0909) 




Operating Income to Sales 0.2656*** 
(0.0492) 
Capex to Sales -0.0290 
(0.0488) 
Note: *** Significant to 1%, ** Significant to 5%, * Significant to 10% 
Tool used: Stata, Own elaboration 
 
Annex 3: Variable Correlation Heat Map 
 








ROA Dependent Variable 




Operating Income to Sales 0.0050*** 
(0.0013) 
Capex to Sales -0.0002 
(0.0012) 
Ln Turnover 0.0109 
(0.0164) 
Note: *** Significant to 1%, ** Significant to 5%, * Significant to 10% 
Tool used: Stata, Own elaboration 
 
